



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

On a trial for rape, evidence of the woman's complaints, made shortly afterwards, is inadmissible, *People v. Tierney*, 67 Cal. 54. This case would seem to be in conflict with the decision in the main case. On trial for rape the prosecution may show, by the testimony of the prosecuting witness, or that of other witnesses, that she made complaint of the outrage, recently after its commission, and when, where, and to whom it was made, *Thompson v. State*, 38 Ind. 39. Evidence that prosecutrix made complaint soon after the injury is admissible to corroborate her testimony, *State v. Mitchell*, 68 Iowa 116; *State v. Warner*, 74 Mo. 83.

SALES—IMPLIED WARRANTY—FOOD—WHOLESOMENESS.—*TOMLINSON v. ARMOUR & Co.*, 65 ATL. (N. J.) 883.—*Held*, that at common law on a sale of food articles to a dealer in provisions there was no implied warranty of wholesomeness. Assuming that a different rule exists in the case of a sale by such dealer to a consumer, the latter in the absence of statutes cannot hold the original vendor to a higher degree of duty than that cast upon him by the common law with respect to his own vendee.

At common law as between dealers in provisions there was no implied warranty as to fitness, *Ryder v. Neitge*, 21 Minn. 70; *Moses v. Mead*, 43 Am. Dec. (N. Y.) 676, and although in 3 *Blackstone* 166, the doctrine was that as between dealer and consumer there was an implied warranty, it was expressly overruled in *Enverton & Marthen*, 7 Hurlst & N. 586, and *Burnby v. Bollett*, 16 M. & W. 644; but the American rule is that the mere offer of provisions to consumers is of itself a warranty of their fitness for consumption as such. *Cooley on Torts* (3rd Edition) Vol. 2, page 914; *Wiederman v. Keller*, 171 Ill. 93; *Croft v. Parker*, 96 Mich. 245; making it an exception to the general rule of the common law and to the maxim of *caveat emptor*, *Hoe v. Sanborn*, 21 N. Y. 552; *Winsor v. Lombard*, 18 Pick. (Mass.) 57, and bringing it within the scope of the civil law rule, *caveat venditor*, *Howard & Hoey*, 35 A. P. (N. Y.) 572.

STATUTES—IMPAIRING VESTED RIGHTS—STRICT CONSTRUCTION.—*PEET v. CITY OF EAST GRAND FORKS*, 112 N. W. 1005 (MINN.).—*Held*, that statutes affecting vested rights acquired under existing laws, imposing new duties or creating obligations where otherwise none existed, should, if valid at all, be construed strictly, and treated as embracing only such matters as come clearly within the scope and purpose of the legislation. *Jaggard, J., dissenting*.

A close construction should be given to statutes which work forfeitures or confiscations of property; at the same time, full effect should be allowed to the legislative will. *U. S. v. Athens' Armory*, 35 Ga. 344. Statutes in derogation of the common law must be construed strictly. *People v. Buster*, 11 Cal. 215. Words must be given their obvious and natural meaning, if it is possible to do so without doing violence to the legislative intent as gathered from the whole act. *Wilson v. Biscoe*, 11 Ark. 44.

TAXATION—EXEMPTIONS—CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS.—103 S. W. (Ky.) 354.—*Held*, that a corporation, whose sole object is to provide a suitable home for the destitute widows and orphans of deceased members of a certain secret society of the state, is an "institution of purely public charity," within the meaning of Const., section 170, and its property is exempt from taxation. *Hobson & Nunn, JJ., dissenting*.